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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 13-1261 
_________ 
 
RALPH R. VAN DEVENTER, JR., 
Appellant 
v. 
 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON PENSION COMMITTEE 
 OF JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
                           
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-06344) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
_______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2013 
 
Before: McKEE, CHIEF JUDGE, FISHER, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 4, 2013) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
  
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Ralph Van Deventer, Jr. (“Van Deventer”) appeals from the District Court’s Order 
granting Johnson & Johnson Pension Committee’s second motion for summary judgment 
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and denying Van Deventer’s second motion for summary judgment.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm.
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I. 
 Van Deventer worked for Johnson & Johnson as a Senior Compliance Analyst 
until he became disabled—from multiple weaknesses in his skeletal structure and 
tenosynovitis of the left ankle.  Through his employer, Van Deventer was enrolled in the 
Long Term Disability Income Plan for Choice Eligible Employees of Johnson & Johnson 
(the “Plan”).      
 The Plan provides two different, time sensitive definitions of “disabled.”  During 
the first twelve months of disability, the claimant must only show that he is unable to 
perform the essential functions of his regular occupation with or without reasonable 
accommodation.  After the first twelve months, the claimant must show that he is unable 
to perform any job in the company for which the claimant is, or could reasonably 
become, qualified with or without reasonable accommodation.  Van Deventer was 
awarded benefits from his time of filing, April 2009, until March 2010.  After the one 
year of disability provided for in the Plan, the Plan Administrator determined that Van 
Deventer was not so disabled as to be unable to perform “any job” as required by the Plan 
for an award of long-term disability benefits. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(f).  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s grant 
of summary judgment.  See Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted). 
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 The record contains four independent medical examinations, a functional capacity 
evaluation, and two independent physician reviews.
2
  On February 18, 2010, the Pension 
Committee denied Van Deventer long-term disability benefits.  Van Deventer appealed 
the denial to the Plan Administrator and the appeal was denied.  Van Deventer filed a 
second appeal on August 24, 2010; that appeal was also denied.   
 On December 7, 2010,Van Deventer filed a complaint against the Pension 
Committee alleging that the company terminated benefits owed to him from the Plan 
pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B).  Van Deventer filed a motion for summary judgment and the 
Pension Committee filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  The District Court 
denied both motions and remanded the case to the Plan Administrator “to verify Dr. 
Barr’s diagnosis and opinion and to re-evaluate the findings and opinion of the Plan 
Administrator.”  On February 3, 2012, Van Deventer moved for reconsideration, arguing 
that, based on this court’s decision in Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 
856-57 (3d Cir. 2011), the District Court did not have discretion to remand a decision to 
terminate if the District Court could not affirm the Plan Administrator’s decision.  On 
May 22, 2012, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration without 
addressing the applicability of Miller and ordered Dr. Barr to issue a new report within 30 
days, and ordered that the Plan Administrator render a decision within 30 days of 
receiving Dr. Barr’s response.   
                                              
2
 The District Court provides a thorough recitation of the relevant medical evidence in its 
February 12, 2012 Memorandum on pages 2 through 8.   
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 On July 11, 2012, the Plan Administrator issued its final appeal determination on 
remand from the district court, again concluding that Van Deventer was not unable to 
perform any job and denying long-term disability benefits.  The parties again filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  On January 17, 2013, the District Court denied Van 
Deventer’s second motion for summary judgment and granted the Pension Committee’s 
second motion for summary judgment.      
II. 
 Van Deventer argues on appeal that the District Court did not have authority to 
remand the case to the Plan Administrator and that the Plan Administrator’s denial of 
benefits was arbitrary and capricious.   
A.  The District Court’s Remand 
 Van Deventer argues that under this court’s decision in Miller v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d at 837, the District Court did not have authority to remand the 
case to the Plan Administrator.  In Miller, this court reviewed an employer’s termination 
of an employee’s long-term disability benefits after four years of granting benefits.  Id. at 
841.  This court concluded that the plan administrator abused its discretion in terminating 
the employee’s benefits and ordered retroactive reinstatement of benefits.  Id. at 857.  
Specific to the termination of benefits, this court concluded that the proper remedy is to 
reinstate benefits rather than remand to the plan administrator, based in large part on 
restoring the status quo.  Id. at 856-57.   
 Van Deventer fails to acknowledge the differences between Miller and his case.  
As opposed to Miller, where benefits were suddenly terminated after four years, the Plan 
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Administrator here denied Van Deventer long-term benefits in the first instance. The 
benefits awarded to Van Deventer for the previous eleven months were only an initial 
award of benefits.  The Plan Administrator informed Van Deventer that, as of March 
2009, his initial period of benefits would expire and he would be subject to a “thorough 
evaluation” of his claim to determine long-term benefits based on his ability to perform 
“any job,” as opposed to only his regular occupation.  Thus, unlike Miller, this is not a 
termination of benefits after years of receiving the identical benefits, but rather a denial 
of long-term benefits the first time Van Deventer could have qualified.  
 Moreover, the District Court never concluded that the Plan Administrator abused 
his discretion as in Miller.  The District Court stated  that the Administrator’s failure to 
verify Dr. Barr’s opinions, which the District Court concluded were inconsistent, “may 
constitute procedural irregularities in the claim review process and indicate that the plan 
administrator did not act as a neutral arbiter, and thereby breached his fiduciary duty to 
the plan participants.”  However, the District Court concluded that a clarification by Dr. 
Barr was necessary prior to any determination of breach.  Dr. Barr’s response further 
supports this conclusion because he stated that he believed his conclusions were not 
inconsistent and reiterated his “opinion from the beginning” that Van Deventer was 
capable of working sedentary duty with the recommendation that he be able to change his 
position frequently.  Moreover, based on our independent review of the record, there is 
no basis to conclude that the Plan Administrator abused its discretion.   
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 Therefore, we conclude that Miller did not bar the District Court’s discretion to 
remand the case to the Plan Administrator when ruling on the first cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  
B.  The Denial of Benefits 
 Van Deventer presents a number of arguments in an attempt to demonstrate that 
the Plan Administrator’s denial of his benefits was arbitrary and capricious.   
 If an ERISA plan’s terms provide the plan administrator with discretionary 
authority to determine benefits eligibility, then the administrator’s decision to deny 
benefits will be upheld unless it is arbitrary and capricious.  See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. 
Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).  The parties agree in the instant case that, based on Johnson & 
Johnson’s plan, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies.  “An 
administrator’s decision is arbitrary and capricious ‘if it is without reason, unsupported 
by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.’” Miller, 632 F.3d at 845 
(quoting Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993)).  “A decision 
is supported by substantial evidence if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable person 
to agree with the decision.”  Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 214 F.3d 136, 
142 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted).    
  As the District Court highlighted, the Plan Administrator relied on the conclusions 
of four different doctors that Van Deventer was capable of performing sedentary work.  
See, e.g., App. 276, 422, 709 (Dr. Barr’s conclusions); 297 (Dr. Filippone’s conclusion); 
218-21 (Dr. Sukhov’s conclusion); 683 (Dr. Trangle’s conclusion).  Additionally, Van 
7 
 
Deventer’s personal doctor, Dr. Strouse, concluded that Van Deventer was capable of 
performing sedentary work for three to six hours a day.   
 From the Plan Administrator’s conclusion that Van Deventer was capable of 
sedentary work with certain restrictions and limitations, Van Deventer implies that the 
Plan Administrator relied only on Dr. Barr’s opinion, since he is the only doctor who 
determined that Van Deventer was capable of sedentary work with restrictions.  Van 
Deventer presumes that the Plan Administrator did not rely on, and that the District Court 
could not consider, the opinions of physical therapist Filippone, Dr. Trangle, or Dr. 
Quinones because they concluded that Van Deventer was capable of sedentary work 
without restrictions.  However, just because these doctors reached a less restrictive 
conclusion than the one adopted by the Plan Administrator does not permit the inference 
that the Plan Administrator did not take these opinions into consideration in making its 
conclusion.  Especially in this case, the Plan Administrator’s denial specifically stated 
that the evaluation looked at “all documentation related to Mr. Van Deventer’s claim” 
and lists the medical records and reports submitted by Drs. Strouse, Sukhov, Barr, and 
Trangle and physical therapist Fillipone.   
 Van Deventer argues that he tried switching positions during sedentary duty, 
alternating between sitting and standing, as recommended by Dr. Barr, to relieve his pain, 
and that it did not work.  However, Van Deventer cites no case law requiring that the 
District Court give greater weight to Van Deventer’s opinion than the weight of the 
medical information available to it.  Given the uniformity among the doctors in 
recommending that Van Deventer can perform sedentary duty either with or without 
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restrictions, we cannot conclude that the Plan Administrator was arbitrary and capricious 
in concluding that Van Deventer was capable of performing sedentary duty with 
restrictions or limitations.
3
   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of Johnson & 
Johnson Pension Committee’s second motion for summary judgment and denial of Van 
Deventer’s second motion for summary judgment.     
                                              
3
 Van Deventer puts forth a number of secondary arguments—criticizing the amount of 
communication between the Pension Committee and Dr. Barr and the Pension 
Committee’s failure to tell Dr. Barr that Van Deventer tried switching positions, and 
alleging that the Plan Administrator had not acted as a disinterested neutral—which we 
conclude are unpersuasive.   
